

THE GREEK QUESTION

*A record of facts and documents
submitted by Yugoslavia*

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**Yugoslav Delegation
United Nations General Assembly**

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**Delegation of the
Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia
United Nations General Assembly**

New York, October, 1947

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FOREWORD

I stress again the unequivocal position of the Government of Yugoslavia.


1. Yugoslavia has not provoked civil war in Greece, and it does not lend any material assistance to the democratic Greek army. It only gives asylum to Greek citizens forced by persecution to leave their country. Yugoslavia does so in the spirit of the constitution of Yugoslavia and in the spirit of international law, inspired by profound sympathy for the aspirations of the Greek people to have true independence and liberty. Yugoslavia in no way threatens the independence or integrity of Greece. Her attitude towards events in Greece is fully in harmony with the Charter of the United Nations.

2. All the accusations against Yugoslavia are founded exclusively upon falsifications and mystifications. They are produced with the intention of shielding the true culprits and of leading into error both the people of Greece and world public opinion.

3. It is the accusers of Yugoslavia who have provoked war in Greece. It is they who sent and are still sending arms and troops into Greece, it is they who have imposed and are imposing upon the Greek people regimes which they control and which are strangling the will of the people. The clear result of that is that it is they who have reduced to nothing the independence and therefore the territorial integrity of Greece.

It is up to you, gentlemen, to draw the conclusions. You will bear the whole of the responsibility upon your shoulders.

DR. ALES BEBLER, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
at Lake Success, 7 October 1947



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I.

GREECE: “. . . a new edition of the old game of imperialist power politics . . .”

Excerpts from the address of MR. STANOJE SIMIC, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, before the General Assembly of the United Nations, 22 September 1947

The so-called “Balkan Problem” was solved by victory in the war of liberation. Except for the Greek nation, where a new edition of the old game of imperialist power-politics is being played, all the Balkan nations have thrown off their ancient yokes, and at last are living free and independent in mutual harmony and friendship. This is surely in the interest of world peace.

The Greek question, however, has remained and has become an international problem. But the responsibility for that is not with the Greek people nor with Greece's neighbours.

May I remind you here in this connection of certain historical facts, the truth of which you will all agree no international inquiry is needed to ascertain. British troops entered Greece when Hitler's army in the Balkans had already collapsed and Greece already had been freed by the Greek people's army. British troops never came into contact with the German units which were fleeing Greece, but used their weapons against the Greek people's army. The world press wrote at the time that British batteries shelled Athens from the top of the Acropolis, at the very moment that the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, arrived on a warship. In all languages, such conduct is called “armed intervention.” It is no wonder that after such intervention there came into being a Greek regime which maintained the most cordial relations with the Government of the United Kingdom, and that the representatives of the British Government took a direct part in governing Greece.

May I cite as one instance of this participation the exchange of letters between Mr. Leeper, who was British Ambassador at the time, and Mr. Voulgaris who was the Greek Prime Minister. These letters were dated 8 May 1945, No. 221/34/45, and dated 12 May 1945, No. 6944, and recognized that the British mission in Athens had and exercised absolute competence in organizing, administering and training the gendarmerie, police and prisons in Greece.

The character of the regime thus created, in which active quislings occupied high positions, as high as that of the Minister of Public Secu-

rity, is illustrated in the following words taken from the Report of the Security Council's Commission of Inquiry: "This body of evidence was to the effect that opposition political groups in Greece had been subject to persecutions, in violation of a Varkiza agreement of 12 February 1945, and that the civil rights of the Macedonian and Chamuriot minorities had been restrained. The persecution of opposition groups was said to have taken the form of large-scale arrests, of imprisonment or exile, beating and other brutalities and the burning of houses as a punitive measure. The evidence indicated that this persecution was conducted by some members of the Greek gendarmerie and by officially tolerated right-wing bands, and extended to a wide variety of political groups, especially the parties of the EAM coalition."

The gallant Greek people who had heroically shed their blood in the long and destructive war, defying such greatly superior enemies as the Italian and German Fascists, could not accept so undignified a fate. Consequently, the Greek people offered resistance to this unendurable regime of the minority installed and supported by foreign intervention. That was the chain of events that led to the present war in Greece.

Considering the danger to the international peace and security inherent in the course of events in Greece, the Government of Yugoslavia brought the issue to the attention of the great allies in 1945. The same issue was thereafter twice raised in the Security Council, once by the Soviet Union and once by the Ukraine.

Even Mr. Tsaldaris at that time admitted that other factors than the current charges against Greece's northern neighbours are involved in the armed strife in his country. On 12 August 1946, he told a correspondent of the London Times in London: "The present activity of Greek anarchist bands in northern Greece raises only a purely internal Greek question on the maintenance of law and order among the Greek population." "He did not think," added the correspondent, "that these guerilla activities could be regarded in any way as an issue between Yugoslavia and Greece."

Within a very few months, however, Mr. Tsaldaris, perhaps after consulting the Delphic oracle, or somebody else, was expressing quite a different opinion. In an obvious effort to remove responsibility from the shoulders of the Greek terroristic regime and its protectors and place it elsewhere, he came forward with his accusations that his country's northern neighbours are allegedly aiding the Greek partisans.

The Tsaldaris regime, and the United States Government as well, now has gone one step further and accused the northern neighbours of Greece of endangering the very independence and integrity of the Greek state. It is natural that this assertion has been taken up with alacrity by all the war-minded press, which make use of it for their own purposes

by sounding an alarm against Yugoslavia and even against the Soviet Union in Goebbels' style.

The regime of Mr. Tsaldaris lodged this complaint against Greece's northern neighbours with the Security Council in December 1946.

I draw your attention to the date. Not until December 1946—although the Yugoslav Government had drawn the attention of the great Allies to the danger of developments in Greece in July 1945, and although the Governments of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had brought the case before the Security Council early in 1946 without avail—did Mr. Tsaldaris make his charges.

This time the Security Council decided to conduct an inquiry in Greece. In his speech before this Assembly Mr. Marshall referred to the Report of this Commission of Inquiry, or, more accurately, to the conclusion of the majority.

Today we shall not discuss the facts of this inquiry, but we consider it necessary to mention the following: Mr. Marshall asserted from this rostrum: "You know that the Commission and its subsidiary group, by large majorities, have attributed the disturbances principally to the illegal assistance and support furnished by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria to guerrilla forces fighting against the Greek Government."

I am sorry, but I have to point out to Mr. Marshall that the facts are as follows: Nowhere in the conclusions of the Commission is it stated that the disturbances in Greece are principally caused by the assistance given to Greek guerrillas by Greece's northern neighbours. In the conclusion of the majority, the reasons for the war in Greece are described in these words: "The Commission, in considering the relation of Greek internal policy to the area of its inquiry, recognized that the disturbed conditions in Greece are a heritage of the tragic events of the war and the consequent problems facing the Greek Government since the liberation."

It is true that the conclusion states that the northern neighbours are assisting the democratic armed forces of Greece. But the majority which approved this conclusion in the Commission was six to five—not a "large" majority, as claimed by Mr. Marshall.

The Soviet Union and Polish representatives voted against the whole document known as "Conclusions." The French representatives abstained from voting and submitted a written statement which was enclosed with the conclusions. This statement reads: "Conditions under which the inquiry was carried out were not, probably, such as to allow us to draw from it any conclusions based on sound juridical principles. Even if some delegations feel that it is possible to reach conclusions dealing with isolated facts, this method involves considerable risks. For indeed, by

throwing a bright light on one particular aspect of the question while leaving others in the shade, the perspective of the investigation might be distorted. Partial conclusions, therefore, would, of necessity, be unjust to the parties concerned and misleading to the Security Council."

The Belgian and Colombian representatives, who signed the Conclusions, made reservations with regard to the question of responsibility of the northern neighbours by adding a written statement to those conclusions. On what evidence are the conclusions of those six members, referred to by Mr. Marshall, founded? *Why is it not stated that the principal witnesses proposed by the Greek Government were criminals or people induced by tortures in prison to testify against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania?* Why is it not said that their statements were full of contradictions and were withdrawn on several occasions?

May I quote only the stirring words of one of the principal witnesses: "I am unable to explain why I have not yet been executed. I think they want to keep me so that I might make statements to you today against neighbouring countries."

Therefore, if the Commission of Inquiry had carried out its task with scrupulous conscientiousness, investigating only facts, without political considerations, in order to ascertain the material truth and enable the competent organs of the United Nations to draw, in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter, and with absolute conviction, adequate conclusions in the spirit and the letter of the Charter, it would, without doubt, have ascertained, with regard to the grave situation in Greece, the guilt of those who, as defendants, want to become simultaneously prosecutors and judges.

In this connection, it is essential to point out some well-known and irrefutable facts. The United States, which meanwhile has taken over the United Kingdom's role in Greece, has granted the Greek Government 250 million dollars with the provision that it controls this aid. The United States already exercises this control, as can be seen from the fact that the present Greek Government was composed in the United States Embassy in Athens. The formation of this Government was accompanied by characteristic statements such as, for instance, that of Mr. Griswold, which contained the open threat that failure to carry out requests of the United States Government would "effectively influence the programme of American assistance."

The character of the requests of the United States Government is best illustrated by the New York Times of 2 September, which states, "A meeting of the ministers and chiefs of staff of the three armed services, the Premier, and the chiefs of the United States and British military missions was held yesterday to consider means by which the Greek Gov-

ernment forces could regain the initiative from the guerrillas." The same newspaper wrote that *the United States is spending \$103,000 per day to feed the Greek Government army.*

If all this is taken into consideration, one cannot avoid agreeing with the statement of the Editor of To-Vin, chief organ of the present Prime Minister, Mr. Sophoulis, who on 26 June 1947 wrote, "The interference of the Americans in the internal affairs of our country is so great that we can say that Greece has abandoned a considerable part of her independence and has put herself under the economic and administrative control of the United States of America. All future activity of the Greek Government will have to be approved previously by the President of the United States of America and his representative here. I am not referring to the foreign policy because Greece has, even formally, ceased to have its own foreign policy, which is quite understandable. It is obvious that the country has become, however hard it is to say, a protected state whose fate depends more on the will of other people than on her own."

All this clearly demonstrates that there is no ground, and there can be no ground, for accusations against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. On the contrary, a heavy responsibility lies on those who impose upon the Greek people regimes which this people refuses to recognize. The responsibility rests with the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

This is one of the most serious cases with which our Organization has been faced so far. A member of the United Nations has, as a result of interference, armed intervention and economic pressure from abroad, lost its independence. Two great powers, founders of the United Nations and permanent members of the Security Council, bear the responsibility for this grave violation of the Charter.

In this situation the following question must be asked: Why, for a whole year, have those states which do not interfere in the internal affairs of Greece been accused of interference? Why has nonsense been spread—why is nonsense still being spread—such as reports a few months ago that an international brigade armed in Yugoslavia had been sent to Greece? You will recall that this particular piece of nonsense was almost immediately disproved. Is it really possible that such a feeble smokescreen can conceal from this Assembly, *whose policy* it is to intervene in the internal affairs of Greece?

The Security Council had this problem on its agenda for nine months. At the end of the debate the United States representative in that Council proposed a solution which did not take into account the basic fact, that is, the open interference of his own country in Greek internal affairs. His proposals gave his country *carte blanche* for further interference in

Greek internal affairs. The majority of the Council unfortunately accepted his point of view.

But there is no outvoting in the Security Council. Thus the Soviet Union representative was able to check a decision which was obviously unjust, discriminatory, harmful not only to the Greek Nation, but to the cause of peace in general, and was able to prevent a grave infringement of the principles of the United Nations.

The majority in the Security Council then succeeded in transferring the matter to this Assembly. This move can be explained only by the hope that it will be possible to attain here what could not be attained in the Security Council, that is, it is hoped to receive from the Assembly here and now a *carte blanche* for the continuation of United States interference or even for future armed intervention in Greece.

Thus the British Government, having found it impossible to impose a foreign will on so proud a people as the Greeks, agreed to have the United States take over the burden which, experiencing similar difficulties, now seeks to have the United Nations sanction its Greek policy and assume the responsibility thereof.

We realize that all this is very unpleasant for many people. But for us the judgment of history and our responsibility for future generations must outweigh all other considerations. We cannot make decisions contrary to the great Charter of peace, which determines among the basic aims of our Organization "to develop friendly relations among nations based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."

The solution of the Greek problem must be found in this spirit. *The only possible solution lies in the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and agents from Greece.* This alone will enable the Greek people to decide their own fate freely and democratically.

It is therefore possible to find a solution for the Greek problem if we have the courage to face reality and, leaving aside all special interests, make certain that our decision is inspired only by our responsibility towards mankind as a whole.

II.

GREECE: “. . . a few irrefutable facts, witnesses and documents . . .”

Excerpts from the speech of Mr. ALES BEBLER, representative of Yugoslavia, at the meeting of the First Committee, at Lake Success,
26 September, 1947

Yesterday we heard the statement of the representative of the United States of America, who outlined the accusation made by his Government against my Government and against the Governments of the two neighbouring countries, Albania and Bulgaria. In my opinion, gentlemen, he who accuses must give proof. However, the speech of Mr. Herschel Johnson which we heard yesterday gives no proof of the accusation which he formulates. He cites no witnesses. He cites no documents. He bases himself solely on the conclusions of the Commission of Investigation. That may be easily understood. This Commission of Investigation is not a witness; it is not a court; it is not even a magistrate; it is only what its name implies. It is a Commission of Investigation. It is a body which has had to hear witnesses and hear testimony.

Therefore, what should be done in order to prove any case whatever is to show us that the testimonies they obtained prove the case, that the witnesses whom the Commission heard and who bore testimony against my country were trustworthy persons. This was not done and this proof of trustworthiness, gentlemen, will never be shown for the simple reason that it is impossible to show it.

The delegation of Yugoslavia is accusing and submitting irrefutable proofs supporting our accusations. The delegation of Yugoslavia will cite witnesses and submit documents.

The witnesses, this Committee will observe, whom the Yugoslav delegation will cite, will not be drunkards. They will not be police agents. They will not be common law criminals. They will not be prisoners who have been tortured in prisons in order that they may testify against their consciences. I made that statement because such was the character of the few obscure witnesses presented to the Commission of Investigation by the Greek Government, and because the accusations which were made by the United States delegation were based on such testimony.

The delegation of Yugoslavia cites as a witness the world press. The world press unanimously gave reports on fights in Athens and other parts of Greece without making mention at all of troops other than British and Greek troops. In the British press we read about fighting with tanks, airplanes and artillery against the Greek People's Army.

I challenge any representative to find in the world press of that time, any kind of mention of engagements between the British troops and the German troops, or of the appearance of any armed Yugoslav groups whatever. There has been no such report in the world press anywhere.

I shall not deprive myself of citing another witness of high rank, the former British Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, who wrote in an article published recently in the magazine "Life" of 23 April 1947 the following:

Late one night at this time I drafted a telegram to our General Scobie, who had come into Athens with 3,000 men to help drive out the Germans, that he must no longer consider himself neutral between the Greek parties, but on the contrary, should sustain Premier Papandreou, and not hesitate to fire upon the Communist assailants. This order was sent at about 2 a.m. on the morning of December 6 (1944). It was only just in time. The British troops, in small parties, advanced and fired upon the attacking Communists. . . .

I was astonished to see what a bad press I got in America. Besides this the attitude of the State Department was sourly critical. A statement was issued by the new Secretary of State about British policy in Italy, which exceeded in acerbity anything ever said by the American government about the Soviet Union. . . . I was depicted in many newspapers as a shocking jingo, Tory, Imperialist reactionary, striving to beat down the free, generous, democratic impulsion of the Greek people. . . .

As the fighting in Athens developed, two or three British divisions moved gradually into the city. For forty days of street fighting we battled for the life and soul of Athens. . . .

And it is upon the foundation of this work that the United States is able to take its stand today.

I cite General Grigoriades, the Chief of the Liberal Party of the Left, former leading member of the party of the present President of the Council, Mr. Sophoulis, who told the Commission of Investigation:

They recalled from the Italian front a complete army corps, the Scobie Army Corps, and they sent it into Greece to intervene. Thus, the attack against Kesselring was interrupted at the very moment of imminent danger for the Allies. They rejected the proposal of ELAS to send to the Italian front ten thousand well-organized men and men who had considerable combat experience. At Caserta, Italy, they exacted the right to establish order in Greece through the intermediary of British troops. The British intervened in Greece later on, in order to impose their bloodthirsty order. They say they brought them liberty. It is a lie.

These, gentlemen, are the words of an eye-witness who was in Athens at the time.

The Germans were forced to evacuate Greece with ELAS on their heels, owing to the advance of the Tolbukhin Army in Yugoslavia

which might have cut their lines of retreat. Not a single British soldier was killed or wounded in the course of the liberation of Greece. Wherever the Germans were, the British soldiers were not. They intervened in December, 1944, and covered the Greek soil with blood. Five thousand persons were killed, 1500 who belonged to the opposition were victims of the operation, 1700 were killed by shell fire, etc. ELAS, of course, had no artillery. It was the shelling by General Scobie. The British outraged civilization through odious crimes. They installed their cannon on the sacred rock of the Acropolis and from there they shelled the people of Athens.

The head of our delegation said that, as a result of these events, Greece had imposed upon her a regime which was in close relationship with the London Government, a regime in which many quislings, collaborators of the Nazis during the occupation, participated, and that this regime was held in power by terror.

I shall cite a few irrefutable facts, witnesses and documents to support this statement. The first witness is the former President of the Greek Government in exile in Cairo, Mr. Tsouderos, who later became Vice-President of the Council. He wrote in the newspaper "To Vima" on 2 September 1946:

In no other place in the world does the impertinence of the lowest of the human race — such as the enemy collaborators — meet the immunity which Greek collaborators with the enemy enjoy, supported by the Populist Party.

Perhaps you do not know the instigator and organizer of what has been called the "Security Battalions" during the Nazi occupation. It was General Gonatas who, after the liberation became Vice-President of the Council of the Cabinet, in the regime installed with the help of General Scobie.

I will take this opportunity, since I shall give other names of people who belonged to the Security Battalions, to make it clear what the Battalions amounted to. I want to explain that the people who participated wore the Nazi uniform during the occupation and had to give the following oath:

I swear before God I will completely obey the orders of the Supreme Commander of the German Army, Adolf Hitler. I will loyally execute all the services which will be demanded of me and I will unconditionally obey the orders of my Commanders. I know that for each failure to carry out the obligations which I undertake in the present oath, I will be punished under German military law.

During its stay in Greece the Commission of Investigation ascertained, according to a document which had been submitted to it, the names of 1,350 officers who participated in and who were members of the infamous Security Battalion during the occupation and who, therefore, took the

oath which I have just cited and who subsequently were utilized to organize the new monarchist army.

In other words, there we have an army which is full of collaborators. There are also civilian collaborators, so-called political collaborators of the Nazis — who played an important role after the so-called liberation of Greece.

Let us speak of Colonel Spiliatopulos who in the occupation was Commander of the Gendarmerie of the quisling government. After the liberation he became Chief of the General Staff of the Greek Army. He had been a colonel in the German occupation and became a general after their departure. It seems that he is still Inspector-General of the Greek Army.

There is a certain Evert, who was Chief of the Athens Police during the German occupation and who actually kept the same post after the "liberation."

Furthermore, there is Zervas, the notorious collaborator, notorious because his collaboration consisted of having a so-called group of resisters in the mountains, which hid its connection with the Germans. Let us quote a witness about this collaboration. It is Mr. Paul Porter, Chief of the Special Mission sent by the President of the United States to Greece. Mr. Porter wrote in an article which was published ten days ago in the American periodical "Colliers":

An even more controversial figure is General Napoleon Zervas, Minister of Public Order. During the war Zervas ran a small "resistance" group around whose activities hangs the smell of Nazi collaboration.

If doubt is cast on the affirmation that these government have had a close connection with the London Government, I might cite many documents which have been presented to the Commission of Investigation.

It is well known there have been three British Missions in Greece — the Military Mission under Mr. Rollings, the Mission for Internal Security under Mr. Charles Wickham, and the Economic Mission under General Clark.

What was the relationship between these British Missions on the one hand and the Government on the other? We see evidence of that in a letter sent from the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Athens to the President of the Council, Mr. Voulgaris. The letter is dated 8 May 1945 and the number is 221/34/45. In this letter, the second paragraph is important from the political point of view:

... let the Chief of the Mission, as well as officers acting on his behalf, have the sole competence in matters concerning the organization, administration and training of the gendarmerie and the police, and prison service. This competence comprises appointments, promotions and, in an advisory capacity, those questions concerning the

police and gendarmerie, which are not within the competence of the respective service. (signed) Leeper.

Mr. Vulgaris after four days of reflection on this letter, found himself compelled to answer:

I agree quite readily that the Chief of the Mission be granted full authority as mentioned in paragraph two of your letter, with regard to the organization, administration and training of the aforementioned services. I recognize, therefore, that the question of appointments, promotions and transfers has to become part of his attributions. (signed) Vulgaris, Prime Minister.

With regard to the internal order, what was this regime like, this regime which had been installed with the aid of quislings and with the cooperation of the British Government and its Missions in Greece?

Mr. Rendis, who is now Minister of Public Security, and who had previously been Minister of Justice in the Government of Sofoulis from October, 1945, till March, 1946, made the following statement on 10 December 1945:

According to information collected by the Ministry of Justice, the total number of prisoners in the prisons was 17,984, among them, 2,388 have been judged, while 15,596 are still awaiting trial. The number of unsettled cases is 18,411, but the figures from seventeen districts are lacking. 48,056 are still wanted as members of the EAM or ELAS, and information from fourteen districts is lacking. It is estimated that the total number of persons awaiting judgment exceeds 80,000, including those in prison.

In the documents of the Commission you will find another document submitted by the EAM which was never contested by the Greek representative on the Commission.

Here is the document:

"From February, 1945, to March, 1946, 1,289 democrats were assassinated, 6,671 were wounded, 31,532 were maltreated and 84,931 imprisoned. This was not in the armed struggle, but after it."

The Investigating Commission visited concentration camps on the island of Icarus, and realized that a great proportion of the deportees were active resisters of the enemy during the German occupation and fighters of the ELAS.

Here is one more witness, a member of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom, Major Wilkes, who, appearing in the House on 22 October, 1946, said:

The Vice Premier of Greece, General Gonatas, admitted that he recruited for the Security Battalions during the German occupation. Yet General Bakirijis who, in the last war, received the D.S.O. for services to the Allied cause, and was recommended for decoration in this war, is exiled to the island, and General Gonatas, the recruiter and supporter of the Security Battalions, announces to the world, as

Vice Premier of Greece, that General Bakirijis is in exile. In absolute despair we are driving the Greeks into two camps.

Members of the Committee can imagine what kind of elections can take place in such an atmosphere.

We have always been of the opinion that the will of the Greek people has not been able to express itself freely, and many persons agree with us on this point. For instance, Vice President Kafandaris of the Sophoulis Cabinet, who resigned following certain discussions about the elections, stated in the newspaper "To Vima," on 10 March 1946:

There is an important fact. We are being directed rapidly towards a parody of elections which will bring about terrible dangers.

Another witness is Mr. Sophoulis himself, now Prime Minister of Greece, who wrote in "Elefteria" on 19 March, twelve days before the elections:

I must confess that the preliminary conditions necessary for elections do not exist. According to my information, which comes from all over Greece, the freedom of movement of candidates and the principle of expressing opinions do not exist, except for the monarchists.

Ten days before the elections, another body of witnesses spoke. This is a letter from seventy-three British citizens, many of whom were Labour members of the House of Commons, and other important British Government personalities. In their letter, dated 21 March 1946, addressed to the British Government, they say:

At the conference of the United Nations the United Kingdom expressed its intention of helping Greece to establish a democratic regime and to withdraw its troops as early as possible. We feel it necessary to express our doubts as to the possibility of proceeding to free elections at such short notice.

The Sophoulis Government has not been able to "purge" the army and the security police of enemy collaborators, and in recent months the Greek courts have continually acquitted all collaborators who have been brought to justice. There are reasons to fear that all attempts to set up correct electoral lists have been unsuccessful.

After the elections the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Havinis, wrote:

The elections in Epirus were nothing but the appointment of the candidates of Zervas through violence and terror.

A monarchist newspaper, "Estia," wrote:

The percentage of abstentions was between forty and forty-five percent, but twenty to twenty-five percent of these should be discounted because the persons concerned, who were included in the electoral lists, were either dead or were expatriates.

The present Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Sophoulis, declared quite clearly:

Only persons of bad faith can speak of the plebiscite. There has

been no plebiscite in Greece, but a machination which was prepared long ago.

Here is a statement by another Prime Minister, and there are many of them in Greece because the Government changes apace. Here is Mr. Plastiras, who stated:

The day before the elections of 31 March, I said openly that an eventual victory of the right in our country will have as a consequence an extension of the civil war. Some considered that I was exaggerating, but it can be seen today that I was right.

General Gregoriades, whom I have already cited, stated to the Commission of Inquiry:

In August 1945 it was clear to us that the persecutions against the democrats would bring the Greek people to the brink of despair, with horrible consequences.

Here is another Greek politician who is in exile today, but who, a year and a half ago, was Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sofianopoulos. He wrote as follows in March 1946:

The tragedy which is going on in Greece today has as its origin and cause the fact that all the governments in power since 1944 constantly violated the Varkiza Agreement. Although the ELAS — (the Greek People's Army) — has given up its arms and the EAM has carried out its obligations, nevertheless the state has not re-established justice, as had been agreed at Varkiza; but, on the contrary, fascists and traitors have been introduced into the administrative machinery, into the army, and into the police force.

Mr. Sophoulis, the present Prime Minister, gives the following conclusions:

Anarchy and civil war, which are developing day by day encouraged by the government and by the collaboration of state organs with terrorist bands, is spreading over the whole country.

It is plain that all these politicians never mentioned any kind of Yugoslav interference, any Yugoslav force which might have influenced the development of Greek affairs. They made no such mention whatever.

I shall now cite as a witness the press in the Greek capital, which today reflects the goings-on in the United States Embassy. There are ten or twelve visits a day, visits by leading politicians of Greece to the United States Embassy, among them Mr. Tsaldaris, Mr. Sophoulis, Mr. Venizelos, etc. I have prepared a whole list including some ten names. There are dozens of visits to the U. S. Embassy, and here is the comment of the press of the Greek capital. I shall not cite — and I stress this point — the leftist press. I shall cite exclusively the rightist press, the press of the party of Mr. Tsaldaris, who is present, and a few organs of the center. Here is a cable from New York which appeared in the newspaper

“Ethnikos Kirikos,” organ of the followers of the late dictator Metaxas, on August 27th:

Authoritative American circles are of the opinion that the three Greek political leaders — Papandreou, Venizelos and Kanellopolous — have resigned after the desire had been expressed by the American Government through Mr. McVeagh.

On the same day — 27 August — I shall cite an article which appeared in the newspaper “Elefteria”:

The New York Times correspondent in Athens, Mr. Dana Schmidt, cables that Mr. Tsaldaris has again informed of his decision to form a cabinet consisting of nine or ten members exclusively from the Populist party, which would be supported in parliament by Mr. Zervas. It has been learned that King Paul has approved Mr. Tsaldaris’ decision on condition it obtains American approval.

I shall now cite from the newspaper “To Vima,” organ of Mr. Sophoulis’ Liberal Party, which had the following article on 28 August:

The main feature of yesterday’s political development was Mr. Tsaldaris’ attempt to persuade American circles regarding the formation of a purely right-wing government and the clear recommendations which were made to King Paul on the subject by the American Embassy.

On the following day — 29 August — the journal “Vradini,” which I have been told is the personal organ of Mr. Tsaldaris, but which, at any rate, supports Mr. Tsaldaris fully, had the following article:

The United States has already lost patience. It is preparing to intervene in a direct manner for a settlement of the Government crisis in Greece.

I shall now again cite the newspaper “To Vima,” which contained a dispatch from New York on 30 August, in which the correspondent stated as follows:

Mr. Henderson’s sudden arrival in Greece is construed here as a move to re-establish the prestige of American policy which has suffered greatly by the announced return of the Maximos government which has been overthrown by the United States. . . . That Mr. Henderson will interfere actively in the development of the crisis and in the formation of the new government can clearly be seen from the official statement issued yesterday by the State Department and according to which Messrs. Henderson, McVeagh and Griswold will, among other things, examine the question as to whether Mr. Maximos is able to form a government which will meet American demands. . . .

On the same day, in “Ethnikos Kirikos,” the following dispatch appeared:

. . . we are awaiting a solution from abroad — that is what we have been brought to, unfortunately, owing to our politicians — and we are now awaiting such a solution from Mr. Henderson. . . .

On the following day, the newspaper "Katamarini," a newspaper of the Monarchist party of Mr. Tsaldaris, who is present at this table, made a statement which should cause every Greek to blush:

Although we are in control of only 10 or 20 per cent of the fate of Greece, the remaining 80 per cent being in the hands of foreigners, we shall handle those 20 per cent well.

On the following day — 1 September — the newspaper "Politikos," a weekly of the extreme right had the following comment:

We have heard extremely satisfactory news broadcast from New York, news that our great ally, the United States of America, which is now the object of the veneration and of the gratitude of all Greeks, will intervene in practice should not merely the territorial integrity of Greece but also her political independence be imperiled. It is only natural that we, as Greeks, should be full of veneration and gratitude upon hearing such news. But we must, alas, ask at the same time what kind of political independence is being referred to when we have been reading in all the papers during the government crisis that our candidates for the post of Prime Minister and of cabinet members visited the distinguished gentlemen Griswold and McVeagh twice, three times and five times a day, asking them and begging them for their opinion, their permission, their approval, trying to ascertain how they felt towards people, etc. The great ally of a small country which is in danger obviously has a right to a large measure of initiative, as we have frequently written here, regarding major problems of policy and strategy in the common struggle. Naturally. Are we, however, deprived even of the right to complain? Are we threatened and criticized when we do complain?

On the following day — 3 September — the newspaper "Acropolis," an organ of the extreme right wing of the Monarchist party, the right of the right, wrote as follows:

Greek independence and the feeling of dignity of Greek politicians attained their high water mark when six of the leaders of the small parties (the six parties which had participated, along with the Populist Party, in the Maximos government) sent a delegation to call on Messrs. Henderson, McVeagh, Griswold and Norton (the British Ambassador), to persuade the Allied representatives to bring pressure to bear upon the King and Mr. Tsaldaris to dismiss the government and form another government in accordance with the desires of the small party leaders. Just as if we were inhabitants of some African colony, we go to foreigners and ask them to dismiss our ministers and take us instead. We do not know the impression this *démarche* of the six small native tribe chieftains made on the foreigners. From our Greek point of view, however, there is but one word for it: Shameful.

Next day, 4 September, "Elefteria" wrote:

At 11 A.M. Henderson called on the King and told him of the necessity of rapid steps in order to settle the question of the Government

... in the course of his visit Henderson explained to the King that in his opinion conditions in the international field required a rapid settlement of the government question and that the broader the basis on which the Greek Government rested, the easier it would be to vindicate the Greek case in the international sphere.

I think that quotation is rather interesting to us who, here, are exactly in the international sphere referred to. There are many other quotations, but let me take one from "Elefteria," which on 5 September said:

A very considerable amount of pressure was brought to bear upon the Populist leader by the United States in order to make him relinquish the Premiership.

In a dispatch to "The Daily News," Mr. Robert Conway revealed that a "dynamic ultimatum" was handed in at Athens by the United States, and contained the following three points:

- 1) United States maintained the demand put forth by Marshall regarding the setting-up of a broadly based government;

- 2) The United States considered that the one-party Tsaldaris Government would make things more difficult for the United States at the time of the discussion of the Greek question at the General Assembly of the United Nations;

- 3) American public opinion will only support unlimited economic and military assistance on condition that a Government in accordance with the democratic sentiments of the American people is formed.

But, here is the best of all, in "Ethnikos Kiriks" of September 6:

One of the day's most sensational events was undoubtedly the agreement reached between the Populists and the Liberals for the forming of the government. This agreement was not reached because both parties wished it to be reached. It was brought about for other reasons. The Americans led and conducted this action. We shall on another occasion examine here whether they did so well or badly. The Americans intervened; they exerted pressure. By a strange coincidence all the ships which were carrying fuel for Greece were delayed in Italy. Greece remained almost without light and without communications, we were almost getting lost in the dark. A responsible director of the State Department, Mr. Henderson, who has arrived here, is, it appears, an expert in talking to the parties in a language which must be harkened to. And thus co-operation between Populists and Liberals was achieved only four days after Sophoulis had told a foreign correspondent that he would not co-operate with Tsaldaris should the world come to an end. For, do not let us forget that Sophoulis had become Prime Minister after the voyage of the unforgettable Mr. McNeil, and that he has now become Prime Minister owing to our dear Mr. Henderson.

This is the independence which is defended against Yugoslavia. We ask ourselves: why is this question so grave that it had to be raised so often before the Security Council?

III.

GREECE: “. . . our accusations . . . have been denied by nobody . . .”

Excerpts from the speech of DR. ALES BEBLER at the 68th meeting
of the First Committee at Lake Success, 7 October 1947

Those among the members of this Committee who have expressed sympathy for the Greek people and who at the same time defended the present Greek regime have committed an act of blasphemy. They have identified the honourable and gallant Greek people with its traitors and its quislings and with the Nazi gendarmes who are the elements composing the present foundation of the regime which is today in Greece. The struggle waged by this gallant people for more than two years proves that this people have nothing in common with those who are attempting to govern them.

The arguments which were used here against our thesis are profoundly self-contradictory, or, to be more precise, as the discussion continued, our adversaries abandoned positions which they had taken previously, withdrew, retreated, and it is difficult to say what positions they are taking now.

For example, the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Marshall, said in his speech at the plenary meeting that the troubles in Greece must be attributed principally to the illegal aid furnished by the neighbours of Greece to the Greek guerrillas. However, nobody took it upon himself to defend this thesis here.

Mr. Spaak, for instance, who was the most eloquent advocate of this bad cause, used a completely different language. I shall quote him: “I do not believe that anybody alleges, claims or has claimed that the northern neighbours of Greece are at the bottom of the civil war which prevails in that country or are the authors or the fomenters. This assertion, if it were formulated, would appear to me to be excessive. I am convinced that the internal situation of Greece springs from her internal difficulties, from the political, social and economic opposition between two important groups of the Greek people and therefore this accusation, if it were leveled, would seem a truly exaggerated one.”

Therefore, this thesis is quite different. Which of these theses ought to be combatted? Should we prove once more that a people must have profound and serious reasons in deciding to shed its blood and struggle against the established government? Is it necessary to ask whether there would be a civil war in the United States if a bad neighbour would take it upon itself to furnish the United States farmers with a few nice new guns?

It seemed that this is useless. In the opinion of our adversaries, we are no longer either the principal cause or the secondary cause of the civil war in Greece. But it still seems probable to them that we give a certain assistance to the Greek guerrillas.

To tell the truth, even this is becoming less and less certain. As soon as we raise the question of the value of the witnesses who support this fantastic accusation, Mr. Tsaldaris comes up and says that the witnesses are contradictory, it is true, but that these contradictions are habitual when we are dealing with eye-witnesses.

Must we still combat this thesis? Must we prove that these are not contradictions of the kind referred to by Mr. Tsaldaris, but that we are dealing with witnesses who said that they never stated the things which are imputed to them, or witnesses who withdraw their previous declarations? Must we recall that among the witnesses there were common law criminals who murdered, during the investigation, a witness whose testimony would be unfavourable to the Government, the former minister Zevgos? Is it necessary still to recall that certain witnesses have been tortured in order to make them testify as the Greek Government wanted them to testify?

It would seem that there is no longer any reason to recall all these circumstances since Mr. McNeil himself declared himself ready to throw overboard all the bad witnesses. If that is so, what remains, if all unreliable witnesses are eliminated?

As a matter of fact, for some days now our adversaries have abandoned this position. They no longer assert that the witnesses for the Greek Government were good. They hide behind the members of the Commission of Inquiry and their honesty. The witnesses might be false, but the members of the Commission themselves are people whose integrity will stand any test. This is essentially what Mr. Spaak told us in his speech. Let us look at this argument more closely.

First, Mr. Spaak knows that the Commission was not unanimous. The representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland disagreed with the opinion of the majority. Does Mr. Spaak wish to say that the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland, who reached conclusions contrary to those of the majority, were dishonest? Mr. Spaak well knows that the representative of France also refused to sign the conclusions and made a statement in which we read that "in his opinion, no conclusion based on sound juridical principles could be drawn from the inquiry." Does Mr. Spaak venture to say that the representative of France is dishonest?

Furthermore, Mr. Spaak well knows that at Geneva the representatives of Belgium and Colombia also refused to sign the conclusions of the majority which are before you. Together with the representative of

France, these two representatives drafted a document which should have been presented in lieu of the conclusions of the majority and in which it was said, among other things, as follows: "The general conditions of the inquiry and, in particular, the insufficient guarantees of freedom which surrounded the testimony, precluded the Commission from producing juridically complete and sound proofs." This document that I have before me was drafted on 14 May 1947. It was submitted to the members of Committee 2 of the Commission of Inquiry. However, two days later, on 16 May, these two representatives — Colombia and Belgium — withdrew this document and signed the conclusions of the majority which they had previously refused to sign, making an equivocal declaration. It was whispered in the corridors that some representatives changed their minds as regards honest and dishonest things after having received cables from their governments. No matter what the situation, Mr. Spaak doubtless did not wish to say that the Belgian and Colombian representatives were dishonest on 14 May, when they refused to sign the conclusions, and suddenly became honest on 16 May, when they did sign.

As a matter of fact, among the six representatives who did not vacillate there were at least two representatives of the governments directly concerned in the question — the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America. I say at least two, because there was also an Australian, a member of the British Commonwealth. As these two representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom were judging in their own cause, is it astonishing that they judged in favour of their own governments?

You see, gentlemen, the question of partiality and integrity is not a question which can be settled by a majority vote as a procedural question; it could be settled only with common sense.

Mr. Johnson told us here a few days ago that wisdom was not a monopoly of the majority. This pertinent sentence ought to be recalled for our debate on the veto. But, meanwhile is it an exaggeration to say that impartiality is not a monopoly of the majority either, particularly when the representatives of powers which are directly concerned push the scales and have them tipped on their side?

We could say more about this alleged impartiality of the majority of the Commission of Inquiry, many more things which have not been spoken openly here and which for many of you will be surprises.

You know that the competence of the Commission of Inquiry was very broad. The resolution of the Security Council assigned to the Commission in its terms of reference "the elucidation of the causes and the character of the disorders in northern Greece," without prejudging those causes, without giving any preference to any one of the causes which might be discovered subsequently.

However, the majority of the Commission — the same majority of which the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States were members — consistently refused to make any investigation of British interference in Greece. It prevented the giving of testimony about such interference. It went even further. When the representative of the Yugoslav Government demanded formally that witnesses who had something to say on the subject should be heard, this demand of the Yugoslav representative was rejected.

Here is the most flagrant case. There were indications that British consular agents at Lerin, Mr. Hill and Mr. Evans, had direct liaison with armed bands of Yugoslav and Albanian quislings who had taken refuge in Greece and engaged in terrorist activities against the local population and committed acts of provocation against Yugoslavia and Albania in the border regions. Our representative called on the then Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry with a letter dated 27 February 1947 — document S/AC4/PV5 — naming the witnesses to be heard in connection with the question. No answer was received. Needless to add, the Chairman at that time belonged to the majority of the Commission.

More than that, witnesses heard on other points of the indictment — Eftimios Joanides and Dr. Ginnopoulos, as well as some citizens who had written to the Commission, Vitaniotis, Infantis, Prof. Michel Servinis and the Committee for EAM at Florin — confirmed the soundness of our accusations against Mr. Hill and Mr. Evans. But the majority did not wish to take note of those accusations. In the second part of the report to the Security Council called "Outline of Testimony," you will seek in vain for the least trace of this affair.

I might give you other examples to prove what I wish to assert and I take upon myself full responsibility for this assertion. With regard to testimony on British intervention which the Commission unwillingly received, they were utterly omitted in the "Outline of Testimony." Not a single allusion to such testimony is found in the so-called "conclusions of the majority." And we are told here that the Commission was impartial.

I have another surprise for Mr. Spaak. The official title of the Commission was "Commission of Investigation Concerning Incidents on the Greek Frontier." Do you know that this Commission, by a majority, refused to make a single investigation concerning frontier incidents brought to its attention by the Yugoslav Government? The Yugoslav representative on the Commission demanded repeatedly that investigation be made into some incidents at least, but no matter how he asked for it—orally or in writing (for example, letters of 10 March 1947, document S/AC4/115, and of 1 April 1947, documents S/AC8/2) the majority remained obstinate. It did not want to carry out its first duty. It was very careful not to mention this in its conclusions, neither the incidents nor its refusal to

investigate them. This is the vaunted impartiality of the Commission, or rather of its majority.

We are told that there are statements favourable to us in the conclusions, and this is supposed to be proof of the objectivity of the Commission. It is possible to say this to people who have never seen Greece, who have never visited Greece since the last war, or who have never had the courage, as Mr. Spaak says, to look through the Report of the Commission. So far as the others are concerned, one thing is clear: it is that confronting the false miserable witnesses of the Tsaldaris regime one huge witness raised itself — the Greek people, expressing its indignation about the regime and about foreign intruders. The Commission received daily letters and memoranda, thousands of them, all written in the same spirit and along the same lines. All the witnesses and exiles who were seen and heard said the same thing, that the regime and its foreign masters were responsible for everything that happened.

I ask the members to ponder what happened to our Commission in the famous prison Pavlos Mellas at Salonika. Before it left that sad building, a body of prisoners presented themselves before the Commission in the courtyard and, upon a signal, the whole row of prisoners opened their shirts and on each one of the bared chests one could read one letter, composing the inscription "EXO OI AGGLOI" — that is to say, "British, get out." These, gentlemen, were the real witnesses who told the true reason for the troubles in Greece.

The true reason was the flouting of the national pride by foreigners. The vigour and the convincing character of this testimony make it impossible to conclude that the Commission could possibly ignore it altogether in the Report, but the Commission did its best to reduce the significance of this testimony.

What has the Commission done? First of all, it calmly omitted the least mention of testimony of interference of the British, both in the outline of the testimony and in the conclusions. Furthermore, in its conclusions the Commission translated the gist of the testimony against the present regime into language which minimized its value — I must stress this because it is very important — while it made a pedantic outline of all the false testimony against Yugoslavia, including testimony subsequently withdrawn by the witnesses themselves, and testimony which the witnesses said they had never given. Nevertheless, the outline of such false testimony is what is before us on the table of the First Committee. These are the conclusions of the majority. Must we add anything to this in order to be able to conclude that the so-called conclusions of the majority are a slanderous and infamous document?

It is, therefore, easy to understand the tragic dilemma of the good Belgian General between 14 May and 16 May. He had to decide either to sign this infamous document or to displease, or more probably, to disobey his Government. As a good soldier, he carried out what he thought was the first duty of a soldier and he obeyed.

Much praise was lavished here on the Commission of Inquiry for its serious work and much praise was lavished on its Report. The question arises why a Subsidiary Group became necessary if the Report was so good, so clear, and so convincing? Mr. Spaak complained the other day about my reproaches that our adversaries were stating untruths. There is a very simple way of avoiding these reproaches. It is not to use untruths. And it is very easy to do so when a just cause is being defended. On the contrary, those who use their eloquence, no matter how wonderful that eloquence, for a bad and unjust cause are often tempted to distort the truth and to use what it has become the custom to call here untruths. This is what happened very often to Mr. Spaak in his great speech on the Greek question.

I shall quote Mr. Spaak. He said: "The Subsidiary Group was on the spot. It was alerted day by day and almost hour by hour, and it could proceed immediately to the borders and find out the facts when the material traces of certain infractions have almost not yet disappeared." What subtle language! Speaking about "material traces" which have "almost not yet disappeared." Well, Mr. Spaak, this is pure fantasy.

The Subsidiary Group investigated two incidents which supposedly happened on the Yugoslav border. According to Greek allegations, the first incident occurred on 31 March and the second on 21 April. The Subsidiary Group arrived on what Mr. Spaak called "the spot" on 7 July; in other words, in one case two months, in the other case three months after the alleged incident. The Subsidiary Group arrived in a village which, according to the Greek authorities, was eight or nine kilometers removed from the place of the incident. The Report tells us—I am quoting—how the representatives "followed with the help of binoculars and precision optical instruments the explanations given with regard to the incidents in questions." One can easily imagine what "material traces" which according to Mr. Spaak, had "almost not disappeared," could be observed two or three months afterwards and eight or nine kilometers away, even with the best binoculars in the world.

As regards the witnesses, the same suspicious things happened to them as to the witnesses who appeared before the Commission. Here is an example: Michailidis gave certain testimony, and a few days later he gave other testimony which profoundly differed from his first. In the Report, despite the protest of the Polish representative, the second state-

ment alone was inserted, without any mention of the more than suspicious circumstances to the effect that the witness changed his opinion about what he alleged he knew between the first and the second testimony.

This is the work of the Subsidiary Group, and I must add that, following the example given to it by the full Commission, the group never bothered to investigate the eight incidents brought to the attention of the Security Council by the Albanian Government; nor did they deal with the grave provocation committed by the Monarchist Greek army against Yugoslavia, which was also brought to the attention of the Security Council.

But here is the principal point so far as the Subsidiary Group is concerned. As in the case of the Commission itself, its task was to clarify the reasons for the trouble in northern Greece. However, it dealt during all the time of its activity exclusively with so-called border incidents which were brought to its attention by the Greek regime, and by none other.

Who ever decided or gave an order to this Group to consider frontier incidents as a cause or, more so, as being the only reason for the troubles in Greece? It is evident that no organ of the United Nations ever decided so or gave any order to that effect. The Subsidiary Group usurped that right; it usurped the right to judge the substance of the question. It did not follow — and this is the conclusion which is patent — the decisions of the Security Council, but the instructions received by the representatives of the majority of the Group from their respective foreign offices.

What else can you expect from such a Group? I repeat what I said the other day, and you can verify this with the Secretariat, Mr. Spaak, if you wish. It was composed of subordinate officials, or, to be more precise, the majority, which was hostile to Yugoslavia, was composed of the following: *four legation secretaries, two of them with the rank of third secretaries; two consuls, one military attache, and another official whose rank has not been noted.* Now, what do you expect these people to do when generals could not resist the pressure applied by their own governments?

If you take into account the composition of this Group, if you take into account its spirit, which was more partial even than the spirit of the Commission, are we not entitled to say, taking all this into account, that what was comedy in the first place became farce in the second place? Is it astonishing that we completely lacked enthusiasm in cooperating with this Group of third secretaries?

What shall we say now with regard to this exclamation of Mr. Spaak: "You cannot mock more directly the decisions of the Security Council." If we are spoken to in this manner, I think we must answer in the same tone, as follows: "You cannot mock a country more than by sending a group of subordinate officials on its border to collect false testimony and to make collations thereof to be used by orators who found out in time

that the Commission of Inquiry produced a result too weak for the diplomatic battle which they were preparing against Yugoslavia."

We are often given the "good boy," Tsaldaris, as an example; Tsaldaris who accepts everything, subsidiary groups, investigations, or anything else one might wish. He is free to do so. After all, he is accepting foreign troops. He permits foreigners to direct his gendarmerie and his police. He installs foreign advisors in the very bureaus of his ministries. He is free to do so. The accounts he will have to make for his conduct will be accounts with the Greek people who, in our opinion, will never forgive him.

However, do not ask us to follow his example. We paid too dearly for our liberty. It cost us 1,700,000 lives. It ruined the economy of our country. We shall never give up one iota of our freedom and independence.

Yes, there were orators here who did not fear to contradict themselves and who, after having cited Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, made observations about our internal affairs which were more or less veiled. Certain people even dared to mention present-day Greece as an example we should follow. A quotation was given by Mr. Spaak, if I remember correctly, about the fact that five thousand persons made a demonstration in front of the windows of the Commission of Inquiry in Athens. This was alleged to be proof of the freedom which prevails in that country.

First of all, the demonstration was not made by five thousand, since we were told that there were fifteen thousand. Secondly, the demonstration was expressly forbidden by the police and those who participated did so in response to a secret call issued by the EAM. Despite the police, they demonstrated for ten minutes, and they dispersed before the police were able to intervene. If this is freedom, Mr. Spaak, it is the same kind of freedom the Greek people enjoyed under the German occupation. As a matter of fact, under the German there were in Athens general strikes against the German occupiers, and there were powerful guerrilla movements, all just as today, Mr. Spaak.

Is this what you call liberty, Mr. Spaak? Liberty which consists in having to demonstrate against one's own government, of having to strike against that government, of having to take up arms to combat that government, or of having to go to the gallows or to prison?

There are people who measure the liberty which prevails in a country rather strangely. They measure liberty in a country by the activity of the opposition against the government. The more opposition, the more press criticism of the government, the more liberty, according to them. That is their reasoning. What liberty is there in Yugoslavia, exclaim these men, where there is no guerrilla war, where there are no strikes, no street

demonstrations and where even the press supports the policy of the government?

A strange logic, gentlemen. Those people are incapable of understanding the essence of a popular democracy. They are incapable of understanding a government whose policy corresponds perfectly to the interests of the people; in other words, of the overwhelming majority of the nation.

During the last week an argument was used repeatedly in the discussion which appeared particularly potent to those who utilized it. We were told that British troops are in Greece on the invitation of the government and — this was stressed — on the invitation of all political groups, including the Left. Let us look at this argument more closely.

At Caserta, in Italy, an agreement was signed between the British High Command, the Greek Prime Minister — Papandreou — and two guerrilla leaders in Greece, the quisling Zervas and the ELAS chief, General Saraphis. This took place on 26 September 1944. Greece was, of course, still under the German boot. The agreement laid down the various tasks to be carried out by the armed forces represented at the Conference.

Why did the United Kingdom call and impose upon the others the presence of Zervas, of whom Mr. Porter said: "Around whose activities hangs the smell of Nazi collaboration"? This is a point which might be clarified by Mr. McNeil rather than by me. After this conference a communique was published in which it was said: "Decisions were taken unanimously to coordinate the struggle and to fulfill the liberation of Greece with the most brief delay."

At the end of the communique we find an item which is rather startling. It reads as follows: "During the Caserta discussions, the following paragraph was deleted from the draft agreement upon the insistence of the representatives of the Greek National Resistance Movement, who considered that the re-establishment of law and order were purely internal affairs which were exclusively within the purview of the Greek Government." What was that paragraph which had to be deleted at the last moment? The communique gives us the text of that particular paragraph which was deleted: "The general commanding the forces in Greece explained that his aim was to re-establish law and order in Greece so that the Government might direct the reconstruction and so that the people might receive material aid."

Here is the picture: The United Kingdom attempted to impose a paragraph giving to their general the right to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. The Left obtained the deletion of that paragraph. The agreement was signed without that paragraph, and the communique

made it clear that this paragraph had been deleted and, therefore, the British general was not to deal with internal affairs in liberated Greece.

The representatives of this Committee know what followed. As soon as they disembarked in Greece, which was, I stress, practically freed without United Kingdom cooperation—Mr. Churchill gave the order, according to his own testimony, that the British general who disembarked at the head of his troops “should not consider himself neutral in the struggle between the Greek parties” and should “shoot without hesitation” upon the Left. Later on, the British took over direction of the police, of the gendarmerie and even of the prison service. They installed the Nazi Spiliatopoulos at the head of the Greek Army’s General Staff and they gave the Greek Nazi collaborator, Zervas, the post of Minister of Public Order. Their troops participated in operations against the ELAS troops, and particularly against the group of Aris Veluhiotis in the summer of 1945, an event which the whole Greek press registered. They interfered in all possible ways in the internal order of the country.

Here is a documentary example. The document I cite was handed to the Commission of Investigation and may be found in the *dossier* numbered S/360, on page 398:

Confidential
Very Urgent

Macedonian Military Command

To the Chiefs of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Brigades:

The Seventh Brigade of India, in its desire to organize better security, decided to hand a certain amount of arms to trustworthy peasants. The peasants thus armed should be selected by a previous understanding with the village mayors, with the British military authorities, and with the chiefs of the National Guard. The beneficiary villages which have to share in this distribution shall be indicated by the prefects, after agreement with the chiefs of the British military units of various localities, and with the National Guard.

Kavalla, 15 May 1945

/Signed/ Commanding General P. Melissionos

What does all this mean in the light of the Caserta agreement? It means that the British flouted the Caserta agreement. As soon as they landed they fired without hesitation upon the resistance forces whose representatives had signed the agreement with the British. They interfered in the internal affairs of Greece for two years, taking sides against one of the Greek political groups which signed the agreement. As the apex of their shame, the police, which was organized by the British, this summer assassinated the signatory of the agreement, the person who signed the Caserta agreement on behalf of the EAM, the former minister Zevgos.

After that, what can be said to the representative of the United Kingdom Government who now comes before us and invokes that agreement to justify the presence of British troops in Greece? How can we characterize the quality of one who invokes an agreement after having cynically violated that agreement and abused the other signatories with it?

A last argument worthy of consideration is the presence of Mr. Sophoulis at the head of a government which was formed in the United States Embassy in Athens the day before the General Assembly opened, and according to the opinion of the Greek press, on account of the current debate on the Greek question.

I shall not deal with the personality of Mr. Sophoulis. That has little or nothing to do with our debate. I think it is sufficient to point out very simply the strange declaration which Mr. Sophoulis made at the beginning of the last governmental crisis in Greece. Speaking to a representative of the United States news agency called "International News Service," he said textually: "Our American friends ask that we sacrifice the concepts for which the Liberal Party has struggled for thirty years."

If we know the fate of Mr. Sophoulis, the fate of being the head of a government in which the Monarchist Party of Tsaldaris holds the vice premiership, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Public Order, the Ministry of Finance, the Army Department, the Navy Department, Public Education, and four or five other ministries—if we know that, then we do not know the fate of the concepts of Mr. Sophoulis. But if we are to judge from the dispatches which we have received from Salonika, which inform us that in a single day this so-called Liberal government had fifty-three oppositionists condemned to death, we must draw the conclusion that the conceptions of the Liberal Party are not an important factor in the policy of the present Greek regime. . . .

On this point we agree with the Greek statesman, who is not a rebel because he was, under the domination of the British, the chairman of the Greek Council of Ministers until the last crisis. I am speaking of Mr. Papandreou, Mr. Tsaldaris' good friend. The latter, speaking of the Liberal chief and present prime minister, Mr. Sophoulis, wrote in his newspaper "Ellas" on 15 September: "The President of the Council gave up the chief of the Liberals."

An appeal was made here to the Committee's feelings. It was told that in Greek cities there are 250,000 refugees, and that these people allegedly fled from the guerrillas. As regards the figure, I leave the responsibility for it to the authors of all the other falsifications which they have so far taken upon their conscience.

As regards the origin of the refugees, and as for the reasons why

they left their homes, I should like to give an idea to this Committee which does correspond to the facts. Here is a document which may be found among the documents of the Commission of Investigation under the symbol number SAC-4/220. It is an open letter addressed to the public by the inhabitants of four villages in the community of Goumenje, in northern Greece.

This is the text in part:

On 25 November all men between the ages of 18 and 45 were ordered to leave their villages and go to Goumenje. There we took refuge with friends, since the authorities did not trouble to shelter us. On 5 January, the army and the gendarmerie encircled the village of Griva. They congregated the inhabitants in the public square and they ordered them to leave their villages within two hours, taking with them whatever they could carry, and go to Goumenje. Faced with the refusal of the inhabitants to leave, the commanding officer ordered all of them to be beaten up with sticks. After that, by shooting on the inhabitants and beating them up, they forced them to leave their homes, so that they were at the mercy of the so-called "liberators". They forced them to take refuge at Goumenje. There the gendarmerie's commanding officer gathered them in a public place and obliged them to sign a blank paper. Most of them refused to sign, not knowing what they were signing. Then the beating was resumed, as well as the forced expulsion of the inhabitants, who were driven to the neighbouring villages. Later on we were told that the blank paper was filled in with a statement to the effect that the inhabitants demanded to be allowed to leave their homes because they were afraid of the partisans. At Goumenje they left only the families of the "nationalists" in order to employ them for the purpose of false depositions. The same mass expulsion was visited upon the villages of Omalo, Kartiri and Kastaneri, and the same means was used for obtaining false depositions from the inhabitants of the right, while the others were sent to eight or ten villages so that they might not be able to disclose the disastrous events which they had to live through. Every day at Goumenje machine guns fire upon our empty villages, and the authorities permit the monarcho-fascists to pillage our property, destroy our homes, and carry away whatever we possess.

* * *

The principal facts which were cited in support of our accusations against the true culprits in the Greek question have been denied by nobody, and nobody has even *attempted* to deny them.

Nobody has attempted to deny the truth of the facts related by Mr. Winston Churchill, concerning armed intervention by British troops in the internal affairs of Greece in 1944.

Nobody has attempted to deny the authenticity of the documents cited by us which prove British interference in Greek affairs after these events,

nor the fact that British troops are still in Greece giving their unre-served support to the present regime.

Nobody has taken it upon himself to deny that quislings and other Nazi agents participated and continue to participate in the Greek Government, and that particularly the monarchist army has, as the nucleus of its officer corps, quisling officers.

Nobody has attempted to deny that the true resisters and all the left-ist parties have been and remain subjected to a bloody terror, or that tens of thousands of honest Greek citizens are today either behind bars or in exile for no reason other than political opinions.

Nobody has attempted to deny that Greece is full of foreign agents, members of missions, military and civilian instructors, counsellors and advisers for governmental services and for the government itself, or that among them is an increasing number of Americans.

Nobody has attempted to deny that the superior council of the monarchist army is composed of the chiefs of the British and American military missions, who are sitting side by side with the Greeks.

Nobody has attempted to deny that a very important part of the so-called American "assistance" to Greece was utilized for military ends, in other words, in order to wage civil war against the Greek democratic army.

Nobody has attempted to deny that an important part in the last Greek crisis was played by the American advisors Griswold, McVeagh and Henderson.

In other words, gentlemen, you have conceded the principal facts for our judgment on the Greek question.

Our accusation has remained intact in spite of the torrent of arguments. That is why we are entitled to demand that the Committee draw just and equitable conclusions from the facts cited above, and those conclusions can only be the following:

The United Kingdom and the United States are guilty of armed interference in the internal affairs of a member state of the United Nations, Greece.

In order to fulfill our duty, in order to be faithful to the Charter, we ought to adopt the resolution proposed by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and it is this resolution which we support un-reservedly.

Now, I have only a couple of words to say about the "compromise" offered here by Mr. Johnson on behalf of the United States delegation. We were a little surprised that the United States delegation so rapidly abandoned half of its own resolution. We expected a certain withdrawal, since the accusations against us, which are at the basis of the United States reso-

lution, are absolutely untenable according to world public opinion. But what did surprise us was the fact that the withdrawal was so quick. It took place even before the end of the general discussion. As a matter of fact it took place in the middle of the general discussion.

Is there need of better proof of the fact that the United States delegation begins to be inconvenienced by its own offspring, by its slanderous accusations, by the fact that, as certain representatives have stated in the couloirs, they have got up this monstrous new Dreyfus affair?

Accordingly, we believe that the United States delegation, in order to be consistent, having abandoned the first half of its resolution, should do the same with regard to the second half. The second half deserves exactly the same fate as the first.

IV.

GREECE: “. . . an intentional distortion of the truth.”

Excerpts from the speech of Yugoslav Ambassador SAVA N. KOSANOVIC before the Security Council, 16 December 1946

In his speech of 12 December before the Security Council, Mr. Tsaldaris quoted a statement made by the Premier of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, to an American correspondent. As recorded on page 52 of the verbatim record of last Thursday's session, he said the following:

Let me, in conclusion, quote from a statement made on 16 October by Marshal Tito to an American correspondent: “The problem of Aegean Macedonia was not raised by our Government as one of those which ought to have been settled in the final phase of the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, it should be understood that we cannot remain indifferent to the situation arising from the persecution of the population of Macedonia by the organs of the Greek Government. I cannot tell you what are the measures that we shall take, but we shall certainly take measures intended to put an end to the terrorization of minorities in Greece and particularly of those in Aegean Macedonia.”*

According to my information, the statement which Marshal Tito gave the *New York Times* correspondent, Mr. Sulzberger, was the following:

We have not put forward the issue of Aegean Macedonia at all at this first phase of the Peace Conference, but in view of the situation that has arisen more recently in Macedonia, arising from the persecution of the Macedonian people not only by the organs of the Government but by illegal bands and monarchist groups seeking to terrorize the people, we cannot remain indifferent to what is happening there. We intend to take certain steps before the United Nations. What these steps will be, I cannot tell. But there will be some; of that I am certain . . . I emphasize that Yugoslavia will take no steps in this respect except before the United Nations. Any other statement or rumour is false and only designed to damage our country.†

I ask you to note that, in its first edition of 13 December 1946, the *New York Times*, which cannot be said to be inclined either towards my country or towards me, published the entire text of Mr. Tsaldaris' speech, but only some thirty lines of my own. On that day it stated:

As proof of the drive to separate Macedonia from Greece, Mr. Tsaldaris submitted a statement from Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia which, he said, had been made to an American correspondent on 16 October.

* Quotation of the English interpretation of M. Tsaldaris' speech, the official translation of which appears in the *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, Second Series, No. 25 (translated from the original French).

† See the *New York Times*, 15 October 1946.

Then followed the mentioned quotation of Mr. Tsaldaris' speech, and the *New York Times* continued:

Mr. Tsaldaris apparently referred to an article by C. L. Sulzberger that appeared in the *New York Times* of 15 October. It might have been cabled to Athens the next day, and the text may have been garbled in transmission. The *New York Times* interview with the Yugoslav leader emphasized, however, that Marshal Tito had said that the measures he would take would be *before the United Nations*.

This is then followed by the quotation of the correct text of Marshal Tito's original statement which I have already quoted. From this it is clear that, in an attempt to prove that Yugoslavia has aggressive tendencies against Greece, Mr. Tsaldaris omitted the most essential part of Marshal Tito's statement, the part which every friend of the United Nations would greet, namely, that Yugoslavia will take no steps against Greece except *before the United Nations*, and that any other statement or rumour is false. Twice Mr. Tsaldaris omitted the same idea. It is also clear from the above that this omission was not accidental. Not only do we have here an untruthful statement, but much more, we have an intentional distortion of the truth. Here we have a malicious, false "fix" presented to this high forum in a deliberate effort to mislead it and to bring about a wrong decision.

I have pondered carefully over all these words. In my speech before the Security Council,[‡] I expressed indignation at the carelessness, levity and unscrupulousness of Mr. Tsaldaris' accusation against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. But, when I spoke last Thursday, I did not think that I would have such a strong confirmation of such flagrant falsification quite so soon.

Now it is clear to me why the documents presented to you are without signatures or any signs of authenticity. If Mr. Tsaldaris had acted in this way before any court, the procedure would immediately be stopped and the author delivered to the prosecutor. I leave it to you how to proceed in this instance.

[‡] See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, Second Series, No. 25.

ANNEX

FACTS: ABOUT THE GREEK WITNESSES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

Their Background, Their Records and Their Credibility

1. F. Kontapanos-Anivas

According to his own statement in the Greek White Book, he had rendered services to the gendarmerie even before the war.

Two of his own brothers wrote to the Commission of Investigation saying that Anivas was an immoral character and a tool in the hands of the police. One of his brothers asserts in writing that Anivas, when under arrest during the activities of the Commission of Investigation, was a guest at the British Embassy in Athens. The wife of this witness was released from a concentration camp on the very day he gave his testimony to the Commission of Investigation. (See SAC-4-220.)

* * *

The statement of this witness is filled with contradictions and falsehoods. He declared that Yugoslavia was giving military training to Greek refugee youths, through the formation of military youth brigades. It is true that he was forced to admit that such youth formations were organized to work on the Brcko-Banovici railway (together with thousands of youths from Yugoslavia and a great number of other countries)—but he proclaimed the Brcko-Banovici railway a *strategic* one. Furthermore, he *transferred* the railway from Bosnia to Dalmatia and directed it towards Albania; a glance at the map will attest his credibility on this point.

2. G. Gatios

Prisoner of the Greek authorities.

* * *

The statement of this witness was published on p. 28 of the Greek Memorandum of December 1946, as confirmation of the statements made by F. Kontapanos-Anivas. In the Greek White Book of January 21, 1947, *he asserts exactly the opposite*. It was thus established, before the Commission of Investigation, as a forgery of the Greek government.

On the other hand, when questioned before the Commission of Investigation about the gross inconsistencies in his statements, the witness declared: "I withdraw all my previous statements because they were false." (See SAC-4-PV-34 & PV-35.)

It is to be emphasized that all testimony of the Greek witnesses was given, according to the Greek authorities, under oath.

3. E. Valtadoros

Prisoner—sentenced to death.

Many acquaintances of this witness, mainly in jail, cast serious doubt on the statement he made before the Commission of Investigation. The Commission heard the witnesses Petsas and Zervas, who said they were in prison with Valtadoros and witnessed his torturing at the hands of Greek authorities. They declared the witness had told them he was forced to speak against Yugoslavia in order to save his head. (See SAC-4-BC-1-1.) The same testimony was given by two other prisoners, Nizamidis and Maneris. (See SAC-4-220.)

* * *

The statement of this witness abounds in evident lies and contradictions. When warned about it he declared that all his previous statements were merely a maneuver.

When asked to explain how it was possible that his comrades, sentenced to death together with him, had been shot, while he was not, he answered: "I am unable to explain why I have not yet been executed. I think they wanted to keep me so that I might make statements to you today against neighboring countries." (See SAC-4-PV-36, p. 10.)

4. Patatukas

Allegedly a prisoner.

During the inquiry in Greece the press published a letter from him making it apparent that he had given a false statement.

Simultaneously a photograph was printed showing this "prisoner" taking a gay ride in the company of policemen. (See SAC-4-220.)

5. Tseretoklis

Allegedly a prisoner.

* * *

The statement of this witness shows that he is either deficient mentally or a preposterous agent provocateur. Speaking about the existence in Yugoslavia of an illegal organization directed against Greece, he stated that he had been a member of this organization, and that when joining he took an *oath* administered by a *priest*.

6. Tsausis

Member of the fascist band which murdered Zevgos, former minister

of the coalition government, in Salonika while the Commission of Investigation was at work.

Sidiropulos, a member of this gang—a registered Greek witness—disclosed after the murder the whole background, and his statements were confirmed by the public letters of Giauridis and Paipultidis, who had participated in the affair. One of these letters, published by the Greek News Agency in London, on April 11, 1947, said: "Sidiropulos, a refugee to the Buljkes camp in Yugoslavia, returned to Greece voluntarily on February 10, 1947, only to be arrested by the military police in Salonika who pressed him to sign a false statement. Prior to the arrival of the UNO Commission—writes Sidiropulos—he was visited by the Greek liaison officer Mr. Kiru, and offered cash and good food, if he would testify before the Commission." (See SAC-4-216.)

* * *

The statement of this witness is on the whole identical with that of the witness Tseretoklis. Answering questions put by the U. S. delegate, he gave assurances about the existence, activity, program, etc., of an alleged illegal organization in Yugoslavia. When questioned more in detail, however, he was caught lying, and admitted that in fact, he had only repeated what he had heard from the witness Tseretoklis on the previous day, and that he knew nothing about the matter.

7. G. Zafiris

Member of the same band of murderers of Zevgos. He identified himself before the Commission of Investigation by producing an identity card issued by the Intelligence Section of the General Staff of the Greek Army. Vro.-33.614

8. A. Partulas

Another member of the band that killed Zevgos. From the statement of the 3rd Corps of the Greek Army in Salonika, issued on the occasion of the murder of Minister Zevgos, it appears that these witnesses were paid and that they "requested" to be armed by the military police while testifying before the Commission of Investigation. (S. 360, p. 663.)

9. P. Papailias

In support of his testimony he referred to four Greek refugees in

Yugoslavia—Bisadjijev, Karantzas and the two Popnikolovski brothers.

When the Commission of Investigation heard these witnesses it became apparent that they had never known Papailias nor heard about him or his allegations.

* * *

The witness made essentially contradictory statements before the Greek authorities and the Commission of Investigation. In fact, he retracted the major part of his statements contained in the Greek White Book, declaring that he had not been an eye-witness of the events, as stated in the Greek White Book.

10. Harizmides

The Commission of Investigation was warned in writing by one of the acquaintances of this witness that he was known in his village as an informer-provocateur. (See SAC-4-220.)

* * *

This witness made a rather obscure statement about having spent 20 days in Yugoslavia, in a mysterious locality in the immediate vicinity of the Greek border. When asked whether he could point out the spot, he declared he would need an airplane, as he could only place it from the air. (See p. 23.)

11. T. Zahos

A prisoner. According to the Greek White Book the witness was a teacher in an alleged military-political school for Greek refugees in Yugoslavia and, consequently, one of the most important Greek witnesses. Before the sub-group of the Commission of Investigation he energetically declared that he had never said he taught at such a school, nor said anything like that. He declared that under duress he had signed, besides his testimony, another paper the contents of which were unknown to him. To the question of whether he knew of a case of the Greek authorities fabricating false statements, he answered: "I don't know. But when I remember what happened to me, and after having read about the testimony of Konotpanos Anivas—I think that something similar must have happened to him as to me." (See SAC-4-SC-2A-PV-12.)

* * *

Before the sub-group of the Commission of Investigation he not only

made a statement diametrically opposed to the one presented by the Greek government to the Commission of Investigation as shown on p. 116 of the Greek White Book, but also unmasked the falsehood of the Greek thesis and the machinations of the Greek government concerning the fabrication of false testimony against the neighbours of Greece. (See SAC-4-SC-2A-PV-12.)

12. Hr. Zois

A prisoner together with Zahos, said to be an important witness of the Greek government.

After their utter failure with the witness Zahos, the Greek authorities tried to hide Zois from the Commission of Investigation. He was finally brought before the Commission only after repeated requests by the Yugoslav representative.

* * *

The statement made by this witness before the Commission of Investigation refuted the main points of his testimony as quoted in the Greek White Book. It was shown beyond any doubt that this witness, like Zahos, had signed his first alleged testimony under abnormal circumstances.

13. Ev. D. Karajanis

Important witness of the Greek government, who "disappeared" when the Commission of Investigation requested his appearance.

* * *

On p. 23 of the Memorandum of the Greek government of December 3, 1946, this individual was referred to as an important witness in the Greek case against Yugoslavia.

A detailed statement of this witness against Yugoslavia was presented to the Commission of Investigation in the Greek White Book of January 31, 1947. But on February 1, 1947, the witness addressed a letter from prison to the Commission of Investigation and the public, asserting that the *Greek authorities had requested him to make false accusations against Yugoslavia, but that he had refused*. He said he had been told: "It is necessary that we prove before the Commission of Investigation the collaboration of the Greek Communist Party with the Serbs and Bulgars." (See SAC-4-PV-12.)

When, at the repeated request of the Yugoslav representative, a team of the Commission of Investigation sought him in the Pavlos Mellas

prison in Salonika on March 3 and 5, 1947, he could not be found. This important witness of the Greek government had disappeared, leaving no trace.

It is interesting to note that the Greek authorities not only attributed completely false testimony to this witness, but also gave him the illegal pseudonym of "Tolbukin," in an effort to enhance his importance and give a definite political background to the activities in which he allegedly took part.

14. Vasiliu Filipou

The only witness of the Greek government who was an "eye-witness" of the armed aid allegedly given to Greek partisans by Yugoslavia.

* * *

This unique "eye-witness of armed aid" stated that he had received a machine-gun in Yugoslavia from an unknown man called "Lazaros." His questioning about Lazaros produced this result: "The witness said he didn't know. Before his departure Lazaros told him that he was going to cross (the frontier) alone; he might be afraid if he met a wolf; so he had better be armed. He did not know, however, who gave that weapon to Lazaros." (See SAC-4-SC-2A-SR-2, p. 12.)

We repeat: This is the only eye-witness of alleged armed aid given to the Greek partisans by Yugoslavia. Comment is unnecessary.

15. Capt. Nikitas

Captain of the Greek Army. The principal witness for the Greek thesis that Yugoslav frontier guards had protected with gunfire Greek partisans in the course of a battle between the Government forces and the partisans in September, 1946 (the so-called incident of Surmena).

16. Second Lt. Berovalis

The second most important witness of the Greek government in the same case (incident of Surmena).

* * *

Both witnesses gave contradictory and obviously false evidence against Yugoslavia. The falsity of these statements, and of the Greek thesis as a whole, can be seen clearly from the following official denial, which was published by the headquarters of the 3rd Army Corps two days after the

so-called events and in connection with the libelous anti-Yugoslav rumors in the Greek press. The denial follows: "The mopping-up operations resumed on the morning of September 20, 1946, against anarchist units in the Doiran triangle, the point where the three frontiers meet, ended by the flight of this group *towards the Yugoslav frontier*. Some of the figures published are exaggerated. *Yugoslav frontier authorities did not open fire upon the Greek units*. The population must remain calm." ("El. Ema" September 22, 1946.)

Comment on this matter is unnecessary also.

17. Capt. Kuris

Captain of the Greek Army.

The principal Greek witness for the so-called Skra incident. The witness gave the Greek authorities a written statement, alleging that Yugoslav officers had even organized the partisan operation at Skra (Nov. 13, 1946).

* * *

When asked by the Commission on what grounds he could assert that the operations of the Greek partisans at Skra had been organized by Yugoslav officers, he made the following statement: "No one can suppose that a bungler could have organized the attack against Skra in the way in which it was organized." (See SAC-4-PV-57, p. 5.)

When his attention was drawn to the fact that this was no proof, he declared that he was expressing before the Commission of Investigation only his personal views and impressions, and was not offering facts.

It is upon the statements of this witness, and statements of similar authenticity, that the Greek thesis about so-called frontier incidents with Yugoslavia is based.

18. Tsirigos

Soldier of the Greek government army.

The most important and only Greek witness for the so-called frontier incident A. Paraskevi-Kato Klinai. (July 24 and August 7, 1946.)

* * *

By his testimony the witness practically repudiated the Greek thesis that the partisans, who had allegedly attacked the gendarmerie posts of A. Paraskevi and Kato Klinai, had come from Yugoslavia and withdrew to that same country.

When asked who made the attack, where the attackers came from and where they retreated to, the witness did not know and could give no

answer to confirm the Greek thesis in the slightest degree His only answer consisted of asking the Commission of Investigation to look for other witnesses. He said: "Frontier post No. 55 might tell you." (See SAC-4-SC-2A-32.)

Greek authorities, well acquainted with the true state of affairs, even after this statement by their principal witness failed to bring before the Commission of Investigation witnesses from "Frontier post No. 55," but brought only Tsirigos, who was unable to explain anything.

THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL "INDEPENDENCE" OF GREECE

As seen by the Greek press

I.

The Economic "Independence" of Greece

The United States will apply, in its aid to Greece program, the "method servicio," or "method of boards."

The basic idea underlying the method of "boards" is the associating of American money, materials and technicians with local raw materials and labor power for the purpose of solving certain acute questions in the sphere of public health, nutrition and education. . . .

The United States organizations cooperating in the "boards" of the other American republics include the Institute for Inter-American Affairs and the Inter-American Educational Board, both of which are governmental institutions. These institutions supervise the distribution of United States capital so as to ensure that the money will be turned to a useful purpose and will conform with the aims laid down in these agreements. A basic agreement is signed between the United States and the country which is joining the cooperative, and this agreement provides for the main purposes of the program and the contributions of the countries which are to be parties to the agreement. In the case of Greece such an agreement has already been signed.

A "cooperative board" is then established within the appropriate government department of the country which is receiving United States aid. This is an autonomous office—acting under the general instructions of the Ministry, but enjoying a full measure of autonomy as regards its powers, and particularly as regards the use that will be made of capitals. Such an office is usually headed by a United States official.

Existing plans provide for the establishing of five such cooperative boards in Greece. The director will in all cases be an American belonging to the small mission of American experts under Mr. Dwight Griswold. . . .

"Elefteria," anti-Communist organ of the centrist parties, July 17, 1947.

* * *

Mr. Griswold, Head of the Mission, told press representatives that an agreement had been reached between the Greek government and the U. S. Mission providing for the setting up of a board which would be placed in control of foreign trade. This new organization will have its headquarters in the Ministry of National Economy and will be headed by an

American expert, John Dawson, professor at the University of Michigan, who is expected to arrive in Athens on August 25th.

"Embros," rightist newspaper, spokesman for League of Young Officers, August 22, 1947.

* * *

An expert attached to the U. S. Mission yesterday established his headquarters in the General Accountant's office and will cooperate with the latter in working out the budget.

"Ethnikos Kirikos," organ of the supporters of former dictator Metaxas, September 2, 1947.

* * *

A conference has been held in the Ministry of Public Works with competent American representatives who examined all the information available together with the services of that Ministry. . . .

"Vradini," organ supporting Mr. Tsaldaris, September 2, 1947.

* * *

Mr. Dawson, Chairman of the Special Committee for Foreign Trade, called at the Ministry of National Economy yesterday morning with his assistant and the legal adviser to the U. S. Economic Mission. Mr. Dawson had an interview with the Director General of the Ministry, who told him that it was imperative to coordinate and concentrate all services connected with foreign trade in the Ministry of National Economy. Mr. Dawson agreed to this. He will move into the Ministry and begin work there next week.

"Katamarini," chief paper of Populist (royalist) Party, "Elefteria," and "To Vima," organ of Mr. Sophoulis' Liberal Party, September 4, 1947.

* * *

American control of foreign trade is beginning.

"To Vima," September 4, 1947.

* * *

It has been decided that foreign experts should work in the Central Board for Price Control in the Ministry of National Economy.

"Elefteria," July 9, 1947.

* * *

We learn that at yesterday's official conference, the first between members of the Greek government and the head of the American mission and his assistants, it was found that the Americans maintained their point of view, i.e. that all large scale public works should be carried out under the general, if not under the exclusive, control of the Americans, because the Americans acquired a vast experience in this field during the war.

"Ta Nea," July 24, 1947.

After a conference between representatives of the electrical transport company, Messrs. Kenba and Reed, and representatives of the Ministry of Transport, it was decided that the question of giving the company personnel a monthly allowance should be submitted to the British Economic Mission under Mr. Rapp, i.e. that the Mission should reach a definite decision upon the matter. Mr. Gonatas, Minister of Transport, stated in this connection "that the Government is obliged to accept any decision the Mission may make even if such a decision should involve an acceptance of the company's point of view.

"Elinikom Ema," pro-fascist newspaper, July 6, 1947.

* * *

The British representative, Mr. Rapp, informed Gonatas of his decision regarding an increase of tram fares, which would entail an increase of 50 drachmas on some of the lines. Gonatas said in this connection that "the decision of the British arbiter was binding upon the Greek State" and that the higher fares would come into force as of August 1, 1947.

"Elefteria," July 25, 1947.

II.

The Military "Independence" of Greece

... We mention concretely that the Minister of War of that time, who is at present vice president of the Populist Party and a good friend of this newspaper (Mavro Mihalis), has unfortunately agreed and signed with the British a convention, the signature of which would have been refused even by the representative of a simple protectorate.

Today, after the opening of the crisis among the military leaders, it is no longer a secret and the people can be told the following astounding facts:

In accordance with the signed convention Mr. Rawlings, the British organizer, also participates in the work of the military council. If Mr. Rawlings is in disagreement with the other members of the council, the Greek Prime Minister acts as arbitrator in this disagreement. But if the Greek Prime Minister also adopts the views of the Greek members of the council then—and the people should be told about this frightful provision of the convention—it is the British Ambassador who acts as arbitrator.

Thus, as you well know, our Army is under the command of one who, although an Ally, is none the less a foreigner, Mr. Rawlings.

"Ethnikos Kirikos," August 21, 1947, open letter to the leader of the Populist Party.

* * *

. . . The War Minister Stratos declared: "As to the training (of the Greek army), it is within the sole competence of the British Military Mission, which alone bears the responsibility. Two military missions are cooperating but the British Military Mission is the advance guard which employ 50 officers, as against the total number of 52 American officers who are to come. . . . When, after the liberation, the British Mission undertook the organization of our army, it introduced a field formation identical with the formation of British divisions, considering that if this army was to see action one day, its units should have the same formation as the allied British units."

"Ethnikos Kirikos," August 5, 1947.

* * *

British Army.

No matter who rules England, the Conservatives, Laborites or Communists, She keeps her Traditions.

The Scotch wear their special uniforms. The regiments have their emblems dating as far back as 1680, and even earlier. Their names remind us of the whole history of England.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO OUR GLORIOUS ARMY?

Our glorious Evzon regiments have been disbanded.

Our glorious and heroic infantry regiments have been disbanded.

Where is our glorious first Constantine infantry regiment?

Where is the legendary 34th Athens Regiment?

THEY HAVE SUPPRESSED THE FLAGS OF OUR REGIMENTS!

THEY HAVE SUPPRESSED ALL THAT IS CONNECTED WITH OUR MILITARY TRADITIONS!

WHY?

Who are the Greek political and military factors who have agreed to this? And how is it that they are still tolerating it?

"Ethnikos Kirikos," August 1, 1947.

* * *

According to information at hand, at the last meeting of the General Staff under the chairmanship of Stratos (Minister of War), as well as at the two last meetings of the Committee on National Defense, plans

for the coordination of the operations of the armed forces for the final suppression of the rebellion were studied in detail. Decisions which received the approval of the chiefs of the American and British Military Missions were taken.

"Katemarini," chief paper of Populist (royalist) Party, September 2, 1947.

* * *

In reply to questions put to him so far, Mr. Griswold stated that "the military experts of the Mission were studying better methods for fighting the partisans but no decision has been taken so far."

"Elinikom Ema," August 9, 1947.

* * *

The BBC announced in a broadcast in Greek that the Greek Government had asked that all aeronautical installations in the Athens area, in Araksos in the Peleponese and Heraklion on Crete be placed under Anglo-American control. . . .

"To Vima," July 19, 1947.

* * *

General Livesay, who is entrusted with questions concerning the strengthening of our Navy and Air Force, called yesterday on Mr. Venizelos, Vice Premier of the Greek Government.

"To Vima," July 2, 1947.

* * *

A meeting of the Council of National Defense met yesterday in the General Staff under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, and this meeting was attended for the first time by General Livesay, head of the American Military Mission; by Admiral Sneckeberg, of the U. S. Navy; by Admiral Palbert, of the Royal Navy; and General Rawlings, the acting heads of the British Air Force and Police Missions.

"Acropolis," organ of extreme right wing of Populist Party, July 16, 1947.

* * *

A meeting of the High Military Council began this morning (July 30, 1947), in Velos under the chairmanship of Vendiris. The meeting was attended, in addition to the head of the British Mission for matters of organization, by Mr. Rawlings and the Deputy Chief of the American Mission, Mr. Leyner, and also by Air Marshal Grey and Flying Officer Brome. The question of army organization will be dealt with, as well as the question of the measures required to combat the Partisan movement.

"Katemarini," July 31, 1947.

III.

The Political "Independence" of Greece

I consider that the interference of the organizational missions in the work of the Legislature is absolutely unacceptable, an interference of which the press is already speaking without the slightest reticence.

The organizational missions invited here after the liberation have completely lost sight of their functions, considering that they were administrative missions in a subject country, believing they were above the legal authority of the state, and interfering in personal and legislative matters in a way which abolished state sovereignty. . . .

. . . They are interfering with legislative measures by expressing views concerning which the Prime Minister becomes the arbitrator between a responsible Greek minister and an irresponsible foreign organizer and, what is even more regrettable, according to information I received from the ex-minister and disclosed from the rostrum of this parliament and which has so far not been denied, the representative of a foreign country becomes arbitrator—it is impossible that a self-respecting national representation could accept such a thing.

"Ethniki Floga," Zervas' weekly. Excerpts from a speech delivered by Al. Vamvecas, a member of Zervas' parliamentary group, August 25, 1947.

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Thus, when the agreement lays down the condition that the American Mission will participate in carrying into effect the policy of revenue and expenditure, that the activity of the state in the field of expenditure will be under control of the American Mission and that this Mission will have to approve and accept the program of imports, the utilization of foreign exchange and the carrying out of reconstruction plans, we have to admit with absolute frankness that Greece is agreeing to an interference in her internal affairs and is surrendering to a foreign power rights which are not only economic but also political.

"Katamarini," June 28, 1947.

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. . . The interference of the Americans in the internal affairs of our country is so great that we can say that Greece has surrendered a considerable part of her independence and has placed herself under the economic and administrative control of the United States. All future activity of the Greek Government will have to be approved previously by the President of the U. S. A. and his representatives here. Let us not speak about foreign policy, because Greece has ceased, even formally, to

have her own foreign policy which is quite understandable. It is obvious that the country has become, however hard it is to admit, a state under protectorate, whose fate depends more on the will of others than on her own. . . .

"To Vima," June 25, 1947.

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The United States has no confidence whatever in the Greek Government. Therefore it is in fact suppressing this government through its terms. It is suppressing it by forcing it to give promises in which it does not believe.

"Elefteria," June 21, 1947.

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First of all, as we have put the Americans, whether we wished it or not, on our head, or better to say, put them everywhere, on our hands, on our feet, on our lungs (Article 4 of the Agreement provides in the vaguest and most general terms that the Mission will carry on every function), let us show at least an athletic spirit.

"Ethnikos Kirikos," June 22, 1947.

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The Greek-American agreement, which was signed yesterday by Mr. Tsaldaris and Mr. McVeagh, is one of the most significant but also one of the harshest documents that Greece has ever signed.

"Ta Nea," June 21, 1947.

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. . . But those interested in our geographical position should keep in mind that this geographical position will become much more precious, if it is occupied by a free, sovereign and, therefore, honest people. A people deprived of its self-government, its sovereignty, by means of a certain sum of drachmas, or even dollars, cannot be an honest people. . . .

"Politikos," extreme rightist weekly, June 23, 1947.

TIME TABLE

Meetings of American political representatives with King Paul and Greek political leaders during the government crisis starting August 23, 1947.

I. Meetings of U. S. Ambassador McVeagh

With Palace officials:

August 23, a.m.

August 26, a.m.

August 27, a.m.

With Greek political leaders:

August 24, a.m. with Sophoulis and Rendis, (right wing Liberal Party)

August 24 (twice) with Tsaldaris

August 25, a.m. with Rendis

August 25, a.m. with Venizelos (Venizelos wing of Liberal Party)

August 26, a.m. with Sophoulis and Tsaldaris

August 26 with Gonatas (extreme right wing, Nationalist Party; founder of Nazi-uniformed Security Battalion during occupation)

August 27, a.m. with Tsaldaris

August 28, p.m. with Zervas
September 4 with Tsaldaris

II. Meetings of Dwight Griswold, Chief of the American Mission to Greece

August 25, p.m. with Sophoulis

August 25, p.m. with Rendis, Varvutis and Mavros (all right wing Liberal Party)

August 25, p.m. with Gonatas

August 25, with Stephanopoulos (monarchic Populist)

August 27, p.m. with Tsaldaris

August 28, a.m. with Venizelos

August 28, evening, with Venizelos and Kanellopolus (monarchic Socialist)

August 28, a.m. with Zervas

August 29, a.m. with Papan-dreu (Social Democratic, Premier who started firing against the Greek people)

August 30, p.m. with Stephanopoulos

August 30, with Maximos

III. Meetings of Ambassador McVeagh and Mr. Griswold

August 23, p.m. with Tsaldaris

August 26, p.m. with Tsaldaris

IV. Meetings of Mr. Loy Henderson of the U. S. State Department

September 1 with Venizelos and Kanellopolus

September 3, a.m. with the King

September 4, noon, with Tsaldaris

V. Meetings of Messrs. Henderson and McVeagh

September 1, a.m. with Tsaldaris

September 1, p.m. with the King

September 4, a.m. with Sophoulis

September 4, with Venizelos, Kanellopolus and Papan-dreu

September 5, p.m. with Sophoulis

VI. Meetings of Messrs. Henderson, McVeagh and Griswold

September 2 called on Rodopolus (Governor of Northern Greece; Populist) in Salonika

VII. Meetings of Messrs. Henderson, McVeagh, Griswold and British Ambassador Norton

September 1, with Venizelos and Kanellopolus

